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Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have experienced tremendous growth lately. Their combined 
wealth is currently estimated at $3 trillion, and the International Monetary Fund estimates that 
they will continue to grow to $10 trillion by 2012. SWFs’ recent investments in the United States 
and Europe have been the focus of media and government scrutiny, given that a number of SWFs 
are not transparent, and emanate from authoritarian regimes, which are not political allies of the 
West. In this article, we provide a comprehensive overview, along with detailed summary statistics 
on various aspects of SWFs. We also provide recommendations to facilitate SWFs’ role in global 
financial intermediation. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
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In t roduct ion
F ollowing a series of high-profile international investments in the corporate sector in 2007 and 2008, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) became the 
focus of media and government attention among target 
nations. SWFs are government-owned investment funds, 
which are set up to invest a country’s trade surpluses and/
or excess reserves. Income from SWF investments can be 
used as a rainy day fund, to help pay for a future liability 
(for example, public pensions), or by future generations, 
among others. 
SWFs have experienced tremendous growth lately. 
Their total wealth is estimated at $3.22 trillion.1 This 
value is greater than the total assets of hedge funds ($2 
trillion) but less than the total official monetary reserves 
of central banks ($6 trillion).2 The International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) estimates that SWF total assets could 
grow to $10 trillion by 2012. 
While their growth is a welcome source of capital inter-
nationally, their lack of disclosure (particularly those from 
China and the Middle East) had regulators and financial 
market authorities pondering the political risks that SWFs 
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article, the authors define SWFs as vehicles to manage 
public funds, predominantly engaged in cross-border in-
vestments seeking a higher risk-return combination than 
the one offered by safer investments like government 
bonds.5 SWFs obtain their capital mainly from current 
account surpluses and excess foreign exchange reserves, 
and are typically controlled by their governments.
There are two general types of SWFs: commodity 
and noncommodity.6 Commodity SWFs are funded by 
oil or commodity export revenues, and noncommodity 
SWFs are funded by transfers from official foreign ex-
change reserves. According to Butt et al., SWFs belong to 
a continuum of government-owned investment vehicles 
that include central banks, sovereign stabilization funds, 
sovereign saving funds, government investment corpora-
tions, and government-owned enterprises.7 SWFs include 
the following variations: sovereign stabilization funds 
(designed to stabilize revenue), sovereign saving funds 
(to act as intergenerational funds), and government 
investment corporations (to invest in riskier assets like 
corporate bonds, common stocks, and real estate). 
Although SWFs belong to their respective govern-
ments, an SWF is neither managed like a central bank 
nor does it form part of a country’s foreign exchange 
reserves. Unlike a central bank, SWFs do not have the 
day-to-day responsibility for maintaining the stability of 
the national currency and money supply. And unlike an 
official foreign exchange reserve, SWFs are not held in 
foreign currencies. Further, compared to either central 
banks or an official foreign exchange reserve, SWFs 
are able to lengthen their investment horizons, assume 
greater risk, and seek higher returns despite the fact that 
they are investing state funds.
It is difficult to generalize SWFs as a class. For exam-
ple, while the majority is owned by national governments, 
there are also those that are owned by local governments 
like provinces, emirates, and states (such as in Canada, 
the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, respec-
tively). Some are managed semi-independently—that 
is, the government appoints a board to oversee the op-
erations of the SWF (for example, the Australian Govern-
ment Future Fund)—while others are managed directly 
by their Ministry of Finance (for example, Indonesia’s 
Pusat Investasi Pemerintah). There are also those that are 
managed by their central banks (for example, Kazakhstan 
National Fund and Nigeria—Excess Crude Account). A 
few SWFs are under the direct control of their head of 
state (for example, the State Oil Fund of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan and Venezuela’s Fund for Investment of 
Macroeconomic Stabilization). Some SWFs are set up as a 
private company under the Companies Act, wholly owned 
(for example, Norway and Singapore), many of the world’s 
biggest ones do not report their investment objectives, an-
nual accounts, asset size, and investment portfolios. There-
fore, their investment motives are not well understood.
As Philipp M. Hildebrand, member of the governing 
board of the Swiss National Bank, puts it: “The rise in SWFs 
has undoubtedly brought a number of benefits. One of 
these has become particularly evident recently. Against the 
backdrop of the current market turmoil, SWFs have been a 
welcome source of capital, strengthening the vulnerable bal-
ance sheets of some of the world’s largest financial institu-
tions. But they have also given rise to considerable political 
controversy, as their rapid ascent challenges some long-held 
assumptions about how the global economy works.”3
Individually, each SWF is typically endowed with bil-
lions of dollars. For example, the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority, a Middle Eastern SWF widely regarded as the 
world’s largest, is estimated to be worth up to $875 bil-
lion. Therefore, many SWFs have the resources to acquire 
a sizeable stake and take control of a target company. 
While their massive investments can boost economic 
activity, critics (both in and out of government) argue 
that some SWF investments may be politically rather than 
commercially motivated. This is due to the fact that they 
are government-owned; many are not transparent; and 
many emanate from authoritarian regimes. Russia’s state-
owned Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine twice, 
once in winter 2006 and a second time in winter 2009.4 
Even though it occurred under a different context and 
did not involve SWFs, the example illustrates the extent 
of harm that a state-owned corporation may cause.
Given that SWFs represent a relatively new, cash-rich in-
vestment group, it is important to study their investment ob-
jectives and their roles in the global financial market, and it 
is this intellectual inquiry that motivates our article. The rest 
of the article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we de-
fine SWFs and look at their various types. We briefly describe 
the history of SWFs in the next section, and we analyze the 
multiple benefits of SWF investments in the third section. In 
the fourth section, we look at the controversies created by 
SWFs and the ongoing efforts to deal with them. In the fifth 
section, we present empirical evidence on various aspects of 
SWFs—for example, their location, size, transparency, fund-
ing, objectives, management, portfolio mix, target countries, 
target industries, and target corporations, among others. We 
conclude with a summary and recommendations.
Def in i t ion and Types of  SWfs
While there is not a precise definition of SWFs, Borgne 
and Medas provide a comprehensive overview. In their 
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The lower required rate of 
return for SWFs makes a 
given investment more valu-
able to them compared to 
funds that are financed by 
debt/equity. 
lower rate of return on their investments compared to a 
private or publicly listed fund.
Likewise, SWFs do not have impending liabilities (like 
debt) that they are obligated to pay, nor do they have to 
pay investors who might want to withdraw their capital on 
short notice. Therefore, they are relatively free to adopt 
risky strategies over a long-term investment horizon. 
Any fund that borrows money faces bankruptcy risk, 
and as a result, its cost of capital includes a premium for 
default risk. The higher the risk of default, the higher 
the default risk premium, and the higher the fund’s cost 
of capital. Because SWFs do not borrow money, plus the 
fact that they are backed by their government, it should 
be the case that their cost of capital does not include a 
default risk premium. With a lower cost of capital, SWFs 
should be able to supply funds at a lower required rate of 
return than a leveraged fund. The lower required rate of 
return for SWFs makes a given investment more valuable 
to them compared to funds that are financed by debt/
equity. 
Stockholders’ risk is generally made up of two types: 
business risk and financial risk. Business risk refers to mar-
ket- and industry-wide risks that affect a firm’s operations 
irrespective of its capital structure. Financial risk refers 
to the addition in stockholders’ risk, resulting from the 
firm’s use of debt. Therefore, the higher the cost of debt, 
the greater the increase in stockholder risk, ceteris paribus. 
Since the cost of sovereign funds can be lower than the 
by the government (for example, the Government of Sin-
gapore Investment Corporation). 
Next, all SWFs do not invest in the same way. While 
some invest primarily in their local economy (for exam-
ple, Khazanah Nasional BHD in Malaysia), others invest 
predominantly abroad (for example, the China Invest-
ment Corporation). There are SWFs that invest conser-
vatively in safe assets like government bonds, and there 
are also those that undertake riskier investments through 
participation in joint ventures and/or private-equity deals 
and/or buyouts (for example, Abu Dhabi Investment Au-
thority, Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Development Company, 
and the China Investment Corporation). A few SWFs 
invest as pension funds in the sense that they are set up 
to facilitate government savings necessary to meet public 
pension expenditure (for example, the Government Pen-
sion Fund-Global of Norway). While some governments 
establish only one such fund, others establish a family of 
those funds (for example, the United Arab Emirates). 
Therefore, SWFs differ in their objectives, the way they 
are managed, and their investment approaches. 
History  of  SWfs
Kuwait founded the first SWF in 1953, the Kuwait Invest-
ment Authority (KIA). KIA’s objective was to achieve rev-
enue diversification, since Kuwait was overly dependent 
on revenue from oil exploration and oil sales. Following 
KIA, there wasn’t a major wave of SWF creation until 
the 1970s, when Singapore, Abu Dhabi, and Canada all 
created their first SWFs. Norway set up the most trans-
parent—and among the world’s largest—SWF in 1990. 
There was then a second major wave of SWF creation in 
the 2000s. In 2007, China formed the China Investment 
Corporation with an initial endowment estimated at $200 
billion, and Russia announced a pair of new SWFs with a 
combined wealth estimated at $150 billion. Currently, a 
number of countries have these funds, and a few more 
have expressed an interest in establishing one.8 Most 
SWFs are located in either oil-producing nations or in 
economies running trade surpluses. 
The Benef i ts  of  SWf Investments
Benefits of SWfs to Recipient firms
For a publicly incorporated fund, its cost of capital is 
usually a weighted average of its costs of debt and equity. 
However, since SWFs do not borrow money or sell stock 
to the public, they incur neither a cost of debt nor a cost 
of equity, which potentially allows SWFs to demand a 
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generally react favorably to these announcements.12 On 
average, the stock price of the target firm increases by 2% 
(on a risk-adjusted basis during the three-day window sur-
rounding the announcement date). In dollar terms, the 
market value of the target firm increases by $327 million 
on average (median increase of $60 million) in the first 
two days of the announcement. However, the market re-
action is more favorable for more transparent SWFs, such 
as Norway and Singapore. 
Benefits to Investing Governments
SWFs provide multiple benefits to their home-country 
governments. First, through their investments, SWFs en-
able their governments to diversify their income sources. 
Diversification allows the minimization of risk and does 
not leave the government completely exposed to the 
price volatilities in one commodity/asset. Second, SWFs 
allow governments to profitably invest their excess for-
eign exchange reserves, trade surpluses, and/or bud-
get surpluses. Third, by investing in their local indus-
tries, SWFs help in creating/preserving employment and 
growth. Fourth, by investing abroad, an SWF can help to 
improve the reputation of its home government as being 
business-friendly and playing an important role in global 
financial intermediation (as is the case with Dubai and 
Abu Dhabi). Fifth, by investing abroad, an SWF allows its 
government the opportunity to access new skills, knowl-
edge, and technology to support the development of its 
domestic industries and sectors. For example, Dubai’s 
stock exchange is now using a new trading system devel-
oped by Nasdaq following SWF investments by its govern-
ment in Nasdaq and the London Stock Exchange.
When Are  SWf Investments 
controvers ia l?
Except for Norway and Singapore, the world’s largest 
SWFs disclose too little information relative to their size. 
There is ample evidence that a lack of disclosure in these 
cases generates a lot of political concern.13 For example, 
much of the political furor in the United States has to do 
with the fact that many cash-rich SWFs are based in coun-
tries or areas that are not political allies (for example, 
Russia, the Middle East, and China). 
Among the concerns levied against SWFs are: 
Their lack of disclosure, especially with regard to their 1. 
size and objectives; 
The potential threat of a rival nation employing SWF 2. 
capital to acquire strategic assets and use them as a 
potential “weapon” against the recipient country; 
cost of debt from nongovernment sources, the use of sov-
ereign funds would increase the target’s stockholder risk 
by a lower amount than does the cost of debt.
The fact that SWFs can accept a lower return on 
investment than funds that are financed by debt holders 
and stockholders implies that SWFs are generally more 
likely to provide financing during a financial crisis than 
traditional funds with private investors. For example, the 
financial crisis of 2007–2008 led to an increase in the 
cost of capital for many U.S. financial firms. Since the 
required rate of return for SWFs can be lower than the 
rate demanded by other investors, corporations in need 
of financing during the crisis turned to SWFs for capital. 
In Table 1, we present the major SWF investments in 
the United States during the financial crisis of 2007–2008. 
In Panel A of Table 1, except for Advanced Micro Devices 
and MGM Mirage, all of the targeted firms by SWFs are 
financial ones directly affected by the subprime mortgage 
crisis. Therefore, recent experience suggests that SWFs can 
help in mitigating the adverse effects of a liquidity or credit 
crisis. In fact, SWFs invested nearly $40 billion in U.S. finan-
cial institutions in 2007 alone during the beginning stages 
of the subprime crisis.9 However, as bank stocks tumbled in 
2008 and the crisis worsened, SWFs significantly reduced 
their investments in U.S. financial institutions.
On a larger scale, SWFs facilitate the global allocation 
of credit and capital from countries with excess capital to 
firms that need capital. And not only do SWFs improve 
access to capital for corporations, but they can also make 
it available at a lower rate, as explained earlier. This, in 
turn, potentially increases the value of the investment for 
which the financing is needed. As a result, value is added 
to the SWF-financed corporation. 
Additionally, considering the stake acquired in target 
companies in Panel B of Table 1, SWFs are also passive 
investors. SWFs have not been demanding boardroom 
changes or changes in executive management in the U.S. 
companies displayed in Table 1—at least not so far—and 
they have not been withdrawing funds as markets de-
clined further in 2008 and into early 2009. Rose explains 
how various statutes discourage SWFs from acquiring a 
controlling investment in U.S. firms.10 Kotter and Lel 
provide evidence that shareholder activism is not com-
mon among SWFs.11
The Benefits of SWf Investments on Target company Stock 
Price
Examining the initial stock-price impact of 163 announce-
ments of SWF investments in firms from 28 countries, 
Kotter and Lel, as well as Fotak, Bortolotti, and Meggin-
son, and Chhaochharia and Laeven, find that investors 
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Panel A: Investments in Publicly Listed Firms
Date Target Target’s Business Target Exchange acquirer Origin
25-Jul-07 Fortress Inv. Group LLC Asset Management NYSE Qatar Investment Authority Qatar
22-Aug-07 MGM Mirage Resorts & Casinos NYSE Dubai World uae
20-Sep-07 Nasdaq Stock Market Inc. Security & Commodity Exch Nasdaq Borse Dubai uae
23-Oct-07 Bear Stearns Cos. Inc. Security Brokers & Dealers NYSE CITIC Securities Co. Ltd China
16-Nov-07 Advanced Micro Devices Inc. Semiconductors NYSE Mubadala Development Co. uae
26-Nov-07 Citigroup Inc. Money Center Banks NYSE Abu Dhabi Inv. Authority uae
19-Dec-07 Morgan Stanley Security Brokers & Dealers NYSE China Investment Corp. China
24-Dec-07 Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. Security Brokers & Dealers NYSE Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd Singapore
15-Jan-08 Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. Security Brokers & Dealers NYSE Kuwait Investment Authority Kuwait
15-Jan-08 Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. Security Brokers & Dealers NYSE Korea Investment Corporation South Korea
15-Jan-08 Citigroup Inc. Money Center Banks NYSE Kuwait Investment Authority Kuwait
15-Jan-08 Citigroup Inc. Money Center Banks NYSE Government Inv. Corp. Singapore
Panel B: Investments in Initial Public Offerings
Date Target Target Industry Target Exchange acquirer Origin
22-Jun-07 Blackstone Group LLC Asset Management NYSE China State Investment Corp. China
29-Oct-07 Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt Grp LLC Asset Management NYSE Dubai International Capital uae
7-Apr-08 Visa Inc. Business Services NYSE Kuwait Investment Authority Kuwait
Panel C: Investments in Publicly Listed Firms
Date Target acquirer transparency Amount ($Mil.) Transaction/Security Stake (%)
25-Jul-07 Fortress Inv Group 
LLC
Qatar Investment Authority 1 undisclosed Privately negotiated Minority
22-Aug-07 MGM Mirage Dubai World 5         5,200 Seasoned Equity Offering
and Public tender 
9.50
20-Sep-07 Nasdaq Stock Market 
Inc.
Borse Dubai 5 Cross Invest Cross Invest 19.99
23-Oct-07 Bear Stearns Cos. Inc. CITIC Securities Co. Ltd 2 Cr. Inv. 1,000 Withdrawn 9.90
16-Nov-07 Advanced Micro  
Devices Inc.
Mubadala Development Co. 3            608 Secondary Equity Offering 8.00
26-Nov-07 Citigroup Inc. Abu Dhabi Inv. Authority 3           7,500 Convertible Preferred 4.90
19-Dec-07 Morgan Stanley China Investment Corp. 2         5,000 Convertible Preferred 9.90
24-Dec-07 Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. Temasek Holdings (Pte) Ltd 7 4,400 Newly Issued Common Stock 
in a Private Placement
9.40
15-Jan-08 Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. Kuwait Investment Authority 6 2,000 Convertible Preferred 3.00
15-Jan-08 Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc. Korea Investment Corporation 9 2,000 Convertible Preferred 3.00
15-Jan-08 Citigroup Inc. Kuwait Investment Authority 6 3,000 Convertible Preferred 1.60
15-Jan-08 Citigroup Inc. Government Inv. Corp. 6 6,880 Convertible Preferred 3.70
Panel D: Investments in Initial Public Offerings
Date Target acquirer transparency Amount ($Mil.) Transaction/Security Stake (%)
22-Jun-07 Blackstone Group LLC China State Investment Corp. 2 3,000 Initial Public Offering 9.70
29-Oct-07 Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt 
Grp LLC
Dubai International Capital 5 1,250 Initial Public Offering 9.90
7-Apr-08 Visa Inc. Kuwait Investment Authority 6 800 Initial Public Offering 4.00
table 1 Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Investments in the United States
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As a result of the political 
concerns, some SWF-target 
countries have passed legis-
lation to contain the poten-
tial political risks of SWF 
investments. 
in 2007, and Australia and Germany in 2008 took similar 
measures.17 In October 2008, the IMF published a set of 
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, known as 
the Santiago Principles, as best practices for SWFs.18 At 
the same time, member countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
which collectively attracts major SWF investments, vowed 
to treat SWFs fairly and not restrict their investments as 
long as SWFs do not pose a threat to national security. In 
March 2008, the U.S. Department of Treasury reached a 
voluntary agreement with Abu Dhabi and Singapore that 
their SWFs will invest for purely financial reasons when 
considering opportunities in the United States.19
empir ica l  ev idence on the 
funct ioning of  SWfs
Data
Collecting data on SWFs can be very challenging because 
many SWFs provide very little public information. We 
use three primary sources for SWF data. The first one is 
the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, a California-based 
organization designed to study SWFs and their impact on 
global economics, politics, financial markets, trade, and 
public policy.20 Next, we collect data on SWF investments 
from the Zephyr database, which covers investment deals 
and transactions internationally. Zephyr covers invest-
ments of smaller value than either Thomson Financial 
or Mergerstat. Third, we complement data collected 
from the SWF Institute and the Zephyr database with 
news searches using LexisNexis Academic. Our sample 
includes 52 SWFs from 39 countries. However, because 
not all SWF information is publicly available, our data do 
not cover the entire universe of SWFs. 
Our data allows us to analyze a number of important 
issues, including: Do SWFs target developed markets 
only? Do SWFs prefer to be passive investors that invest in 
minority stakes only? Do they invest in risky assets only? 
Do SWFs target potentially sensitive sectors like ports and 
shipping, aerospace and defense, energy and utilities, 
transportation, and telecommunications? Do they engage 
in cross-border investments only? What are their stated 
investment objectives? Are all SWFs located in major geo-
political powerhouses? How are SWFs managed? What is 
the mix of their investment portfolios?
Results
location, Size, and Transparency of SWfs
Table 2 lists the SWFs and displays (1) the number of 
SWFs per country, (2) the mean size of an SWF per 
The nontraditional investment approach of some (for 3. 
example, many SWFs from China and the Middle East 
“bailed out” major U.S. financial firms in the subprime 
mortgage crisis of 2007–2008 when other investors did 
not; see Table 1. Many investors feared that the losses 
due to the credit crisis would persist and they needed 
more time to determine the full extent of the crisis 
before they committed more funds.); and 
The risk that a foreign government will use an SWF to 4. 
acquire proprietary knowledge, patented technology, 
or trade secrets.14 
The weak legal environment and high level of cor-
ruption in many countries where SWFs originate compli-
cate the issues even further.15
Senator Richard G. Lugar, the ranking Republican 
on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sum-
marized the political concerns about SWFs this way: “The 
expansion of sovereign wealth funds is not an inherently 
negative development. They have infused helpful liquid-
ity into international financial markets and, in some 
cases, promoted beneficial local development. Yet sover-
eign wealth funds are not ordinary investors. Their ties to 
foreign governments create the potential that they will be 
used to apply political pressure, manipulate markets, gain 
access to sensitive technologies, or undermine economic 
rivals.”16
As a result of the political concerns, some SWF-target 
countries have passed legislation to contain the potential 
political risks of SWF investments. For example, the U.S. 
passed the Foreign Investment and National Security Act 
(FINSA) in 2007, and France in 2005, Japan and Canada 
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Average 2000 to 2008  
Current A/C (U.S.$ bn)
Algeria 1 47 1 18.8
Angola 1 N/A N/A 4.3
Australia 1 43.8 9 –32.8
Azerbaijan 1 10.2 9 3.1
Bahrain 1 14 6 1.3
Botswana 1 6.9 3 1.0
Brazil 1 5.9 –4.3
Brunei Darussalam 1 30 1 4.7
Canada 1 16.6 9 16.6
Chile 1 21.3 7 1.4
China 4 147.65 4.25 152.2
france 1 28 N/A –5.3
Hong Kong SAR 1 173 7 17.6
India 1 N/A N/A –6.3
Iran, Islamic repub 1 12.9 1 14.8
Ireland 1 22.8 10 –5.2
Japan 1 N/A N/A 152.2
Kazakhstan 1 38 N/A –0.6
Kiribati 1 0.4 1 0.0
Korea 1 30 9 8.9
Kuwait 1 264.4 6 29.3
Libya 1 50 2 15.0
Malaysia 2 14.25 4 17.6
Mauritania 1 0.3 1 –0.3
New Zealand 1 9.1 10 –6.4
Nigeria 1 11 1 4.4
Norway 1 301 10 44.1
Oman 1 8.2 1 2.9
Qatar 1 60 5 14.2
russia 1 189.7 5 63.9
Saudi Arabia 2 219.15 2.5 63.7
Singapore 2 232 7 22.3
thailand 1 N/A N/A 5.0
Timor-Leste, Dem.R 1 3.2 6 0.3
Trinidad and Tobago 1 2.4 5 2.6
United Arab Emirate 5 242.05 4.25 22.4
United States 4 13 8.5 –591.3
Venezuela 1 0.8 1 16.6
Vietnam 1 2.1 4 –2.3
52
Data collected from SWF Institute (http://www.swfinstitute.org/).
We used the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index to calculate the mean transparency score.
The source for current account balances is the IMF’s World Economic Outlook. Accessed on March 18, 2009.
N/A = not available.
table 2 Number of Sovereign Wealth Funds Including Their Size and Transparency
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of its investment portfolio and performance publicly 
available.
The UAE owns the world’s largest SWFs, both in 
number and size, and its total SWF assets exceed $1 tril-
lion. The country with the second-largest SWFs is China, 
followed by Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Norway, and Rus-
sia. The average annual current account balance from 
2000–2008 for each of the six countries is positive and 
among the highest in the world. 
The mean Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index for 
both UAE and Chinese SWFs is 4.25 (on a scale of 1 to 
10). The mean transparency ratings for SWFs in Singa-
pore, Saudi Arabia, Norway, Kuwait, and Russia are 7, 2.5, 
10, 6, and 5, respectively. Since the SWF Institute recom-
mends a minimum index value of 8 in order to be seen as 
adequately transparent, most of the world’s largest SWFs 
are not very transparent, except for Norway.
Our summary statistics for SWFs are consistent with 
those of Lyons.21 Lyons’s list of the world’s largest SWFs 
includes Abu Dhabi ($875 billion), China ($200 billion), 
Kuwait ($265 billion), Norway ($400 billion), Russia ($165 
billion), and Singapore (Government of Singapore Invest-
ment Corporation and Temasek Holdings, totaling $490 
billion). Cohen adds Saudi Arabia (estimated at $365 bil-
country in billions of U.S. dollars, (3) the mean Linaburg-
Maduell Transparency Index of all SWFs in each country, 
and (4) the average annual current account balance per 
country from 2000–2008. 
The Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index is pub-
lished by the SWF Institute and rates SWFs on ten in-
dividual transparency factors that result in a composite 
transparency index measure that ranges from a minimum 
score of 1 (least transparent) to a maximum score of 
10 (most transparent). The Government Pension Fund-
Global of Norway is considered the world’s most trans-
parent SWF (index value of 10) and is used as the bench-
mark for maximum fund transparency, largely because its 
origin, financing, and objectives are all well documented. 
Moreover, it is subject to independent audits and releases 
annual reports that are publicly available, and it regularly 
publicizes the composition of its investment portfolio 
and performance. Because of its importance as a model 
of SWF transparency, we provide a detailed description 
of Norway’s SWF in Appendix A. Temasek of Singapore 
is also perceived as a transparent SWF and, just like the 
Government Pension Fund-Global of Norway, is in many 
ways considered a model of transparency for other SWFs. 
Temasek publishes annual reports and makes the details 
figure 1 Sources of Funding for SWFs
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Investment Objectives of SWfs
We collected data on the investment objectives of SWFs and 
present the results in Figure 2. We observe that the most 
common objective is to achieve revenue diversification 
(34% of the total). Under the category of revenue diversi-
fication, we include all SWFs with one of the following as a 
stated objective: (1) to curtail reliance on energy exports; 
(2) to cushion the budget from oil price shocks; (3) to act 
as a stabilizer/rainy day fund; (4) to achieve revenue diver-
sification; (5) to diversify the government’s asset exposure; 
and (6) to reduce the country’s reliance on a single non-
renewable resource. Achieving attractive/high financial 
returns is the second most cited SWF objective (13.1% of 
total). The third most cited SWF objective is to invest for 
future generations (12.9% of total), since SWFs are seen as 
a very attractive strategy to save a country’s current excess 
wealth for the benefit of future generations. This strategy 
works especially well for countries that are presently heav-
ily reliant on revenue from the exploration and trade of a 
nonrenewable natural resource like oil. Another objective 
mentioned by a number of SWFs is to address an expected 
future government pension liability shortfall (e.g., the Gov-
ernment Pension Fund-Global of Norway).
lion) to this list, along with Hong Kong (estimated at $175 
billion), Algeria, Dubai, Libya, and Qatar (each in the 
range of $50–100 million). According to Cohen, these 12 
countries account for well over 80% of total SWF assets.22 
Sources of funding for SWfs 
Figure 1 presents the sources of funding for SWFs and 
shows that revenue from oil is the most common source, 
accounting for 39% of the total. As shown in Table 2, 
most of the world’s largest SWFs are located in oil-produc-
ing nations like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Norway, Kuwait, 
Russia, and Qatar, which is consistent with oil being the 
most important source of funding for SWFs. Revenue 
from noncommodity exports is the second most signifi-
cant source of funding for SWFs, especially in countries 
like China and Singapore.
While many SWFs are funded with export revenue 
and revenue from the exploration of a natural resource, 
some SWFs use nontraditional funding sources. For 
example, the China Investment Corporation is partly 
financed by issues of government-backed bonds, and the 
National Security Fund of China is partly financed with 
revenues from the sale of state-owned assets.
figure 2 SWFs’ Objectives
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and outside specialists) that reviews the fund’s perfor-
mance and advises the fund on investment strategies. It 
would be interesting to compare the skills, experience, 
remuneration, and performance of these SWF manag-
ers with those of fund managers in the private sector. 
Kotter and Lel find that the proportion of private 
industry directors on an SWF’s board positively affects 
the market value of the firms receiving investments 
from that SWF.23
We separately categorize SWFs that are set up as in-
vestment companies but are still overseen and controlled 
by their governments. The extent of government inter-
ference is lower in this set-up compared to the first. This 
set-up is the second most common form of SWF (22% of 
the total). In third place, we have SWFs that are managed 
by their central banks (16% of the total). The fourth most 
common management structure is for local governments 
to administer SWFs (10% of the total). In fifth place (6% 
of the total), the head of the state personally selects mem-
bers of the SWF supervisory board. 
A number of SWFs were established recently. For 
example, 25% of the SWFs listed in Table 2 (13 SWFs 
out of 52 total) were established in 2007 and 2008. That 
period also coincided with the financial crisis that ad-
versely affected financial markets globally. We observe 
that a few of the recently created SWFs state that the 
reform of their domestic state-owned banks and the 
purchase of domestic banks’ shares to shore up inves-
tor confidence is an important objective. There are also 
SWFs that invest in other local sectors apart from the 
financial sector.
Management of SWfs
Figure 3 displays data on the management structure 
of SWFs. Most SWFs fall under the direct control of 
their Ministry of Finance (23% of the total). Under 
this arrangement, SWF management is essentially bu-
reaucratic, with state employees operating the fund 
on a daily basis, supplemented by a committee of gov-
ernment appointees (usually high-level state officials 
figure 3 How Are SWFs Managed
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destination for SWF investments (16.3% of the total), 
followed by the United Kingdom (11.2%) and Singapore 
(9%). Other notable destinations for SWF investments in-
clude the UAE (8.7%), Malaysia (6.9%), and China (5%). 
Our data suggest that SWFs do not exclusively target the 
OECD markets, but they also make significant invest-
ments in both domestic and emerging markets as well. 
Industries in Which SWfs Invest
In Figure 5, we present data on the target industries in 
which SWFs invest. The financial industry is the most 
common target industry, with almost 35% of total funds 
invested in that one sector. This finding supports the 
large inflow of SWF money into the U.S. financial indus-
try during the crisis in 2007 and 2008. Since 2007, SWFs 
from China, Dubai, Kuwait, and Singapore have invested 
almost $50 billion in major U.S. financial firms like Citi-
group, Merrill Lynch (which has now been acquired by 
Bank of America), Morgan Stanley, Bear Stearns (which 
has now been acquired by JPMorgan Chase), Blackstone 
Group, and Och-Ziff Capital Management Group (see 
Table 1). 
The real estate industry is the second most com-
mon target investment sector (almost 7% of the total). 
Asset Allocation of SWfs
In Figure 4, we present data on the asset allocation of SWFs. 
Fixed-income securities are the most preferred investment 
securities (37.5% of the total), followed by investments in 
the common stock of listed corporations (21.25% of the 
total). The attractive feature of fixed-income securities is 
that they provide income certainty as long as the borrow-
ing entity is not in financial distress. The expected returns 
on listed corporations’ common stocks are higher but 
riskier. The third most common investment asset held by 
SWFs is real estate (11.25% of the total). Real estate assets 
typically preserve value and offer considerable potential 
for capital appreciation over time. The 2009 Preqin Sover-
eign Wealth Fund Review, published by Research and Markets, 
finds equity to be the most preferred asset class for SWFs, 
followed by (in decreasing order of importance) fixed in-
come, real estate, infrastructure, private equity, and hedge 
funds.24 According to the Monitor Group, sovereign wealth 
funds are estimated to have as much as $3 trillion in assets, 
and much of that money is invested in bonds.25
countries in Which SWfs Invest
Data on recipient countries of SWF investments are pre-
sented in Table 3. The United States is the most favored 
figure 4 Asset Allocation of Sovereign Wealth Funds
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As explained earlier, we find the real estate sector to 
be an important asset class in the investment portfolios 
of SWFs. Alongside real estate, the technology industry 
also ranks second (almost 7% of the total) as a target 
industry for SWFs. Our findings are consistent with 
those of the Monitor Group in its 2008 SWF Report.26 
Covering 17 funds, with a total of 785 deals, and some 
$250 billion of investments, it reports that, in terms of 
the number of deals, 25% occur in financial services, 
18% in real estate, 15% in industrials, 10% in informa-
tion technology, and 10% in consumer goods. Figure 5 
does not suggest that SWFs only target sensitive sectors 
and industries. 
Types of companies in Which SWfs Invest
Figure 6 presents summary statistics on the types of 
companies targeted by SWFs for investment. Publicly 
listed corporations are the dominant target company 
for SWF investment, representing 67% of the total. 
SWFs also invest in private corporations (23%) and 
state-owned enterprises (10%), but to a lesser extent 
than publicly listed corporations. In the category of 
publicly listed corporations, we include stock acquisi-
tions on the open market, participation in equity of-
ferings, joint ventures, and buyouts. Also included in 
this category are acquisitions of convertible preferred 
stocks and corporate bonds.
Size of SWfs’ equity Stakes
We collect data on the size of equity ownership posi-
tions acquired by SWFs and display the results in Figure 
7. The range of equity ownership from 90 to 100% of 
the acquired target ranks highest, representing almost 
30% of the total of all equity investments. In this range 
of equity ownership, we also include buyouts of private 
corporations and subsidiaries. The 40 to 50% range is 
the next most common equity ownership position (al-
most 20% of the total deals), which can be explained by 
the fact that many SWFs are engaged in joint ventures, 
and we categorize SWFs’ participation in joint ventures 
as 50% equity. The ownership range below 10% ranks 
fifth (13% of the deals). Therefore, our findings on 
equity ownership suggest that SWFs are not passive in-
vestors only, and take majority ownership positions in 
more than half of their total investments. Our findings 
on equity ownership are consistent with those of the 
Monitor Group. The group found that out of 420 pub-
licly reported equity investments by SWFs since 2000, 
half involved purchases of majority stakes (i.e., 51% or 
higher), but the overwhelming majority of these trans-
actions took place in their domestic and emerging mar-




































Republic of Benin 1 0.36%
russia 1 0.36%
Saudi Arabia 1 0.36%
Singapore 25 9.06%







United Arab Emirates 24 8.70%
United Kingdom 31 11.23%




Data collected from the SWF Institute and the Zephyr database.
table 3 SWF Target Country for Investment
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First, SWFs’ governments should improve disclo-
sure. For example, publishing audited annual accounts 
will help SWFs to be perceived as transparent. Making 
their investment objectives, portfolio mix, and perfor-
mance public will improve the transparency of SWFs. 
In that regard, the Government Pension Fund-Global 
of Norway, Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, and the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation are 
potential models to follow (see also Appendix A). The 
more information SWFs make available to the public, 
the less resistance they will face. Furthermore, home-
country governments should not use SWFs to advance 
geopolitical goals. 
Private equity firms and hedge funds do not dis-
close information publicly. Therefore, why the call 
for SWFs to be more transparent? One of the reasons 
is that private equity firms and hedge funds are not 
government-owned, do not emanate from authoritar-
ian regimes, and are not engaging in politically contro-
versial investments. Nevertheless, had a private equity 
firm or hedge fund of the same size as an SWF originat-
kets.27 Thirty-seven percent of the deals involved stakes 
of between 10% and 50%. 
Summary and Recommendat ions
The advent of SWFs was inevitable. The opportunity 
cost of holding foreign exchange reserves and run-
ning trade surpluses in emerging economies have been 
mounting over time. High oil prices will continue to give 
oil-exporting countries more financial heft.28 Holding 
excess wealth in a foreign currency and/or risk-free gov-
ernment bonds is not the perfect solution for countries 
with mounting reserves year after year. First, foreign 
currency reserves expose countries to foreign exchange 
risk. Second, the yields on government bonds (for ex-
ample, U.S. Treasury Bills) have been decreasing over 
time and are currently very low. By creating SWFs, these 
countries have been able to invest their excess wealth 
more profitably. In this concluding section, we propose 
how the various stakeholders should proceed to accom-
modate each other.
figure 5 Industries Targeted by Sovereign Wealth Funds for Investment
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cal differences will cause some SWF investments to be 
viewed suspiciously.
Second, while it is important for recipient-country 
governments to thoroughly scrutinize SWF investments 
to assess the geopolitical risks that they may pose, it is 
also important that host-country governments com-
municate and clarify all the rules and procedures 
involved to SWF governments. This should be done 
at a very early stage in the process. Both governments 
should also assess the noncommercial implications of 
the investment and the public reactions to them. Host-
country governments should also make sure that they 
are seen as assessing all inward investments (SWFs and 
non-SWFs) in the same way and are not discrimina-
tory. 
Last, but not least, while international associations 
like the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and the European 
Commission do not have jurisdictional authority over 
SWFs, they should continue to engage all stakeholders 
in developing “best operational practices.” Even though 
adherence to the principles is voluntary, the engagement 
of all parties ensures that they are listening to each other 
and know what to do to improve their relations and facili-
tate SWF investments.
ing from an authoritarian regime been investing in the 
United States or Western Europe, it could have sparked 
a similar political furor. While there is no evidence 
yet of an SWF being used as a political weapon, politi-
figure 6 Types of Corporations Targeted by SWFs
figure 7 SWFs’ Percentage of Equity Ownership Acquired in Acquisitions of Common 
Stock (Including IPOs), Joint Ventures, Private Equity Deals, and Buyouts
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The Government Pension Fund-Global of Norway (GPF) is considered to be a very transparent SWF and a model that other SWFs may 
follow. In its annual reports, the fund states its objective as “to support government saving to finance pension expenditure and underpin long-
term considerations in the use of Norway’s petroleum revenue.”
GPF falls under the responsibility of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. However, the latter has delegated management of the fund to Norges 
Bank Investment Management (NBIM), a unit of the Norwegian central bank (Norges Bank). The fund invests internationally in equities, fixed-
income instruments, money market instruments, and derivatives. It has offices in Oslo, London, New York, and Shanghai. It employed 217 
people as of December 31, 2008. As well as managing the funds internally, NBIM employs external managers. As of December 31, 2008, NBIM 
employed 33 external equity managers and nine external fixed-income managers. The market value of GPF is estimated at $350 billion.
The Ministry of Finance decides on the fund’s investment strategy. It also establishes a benchmark portfolio that the fund has to match. Quar-
terly reports are prepared and published, as well as annual reports. In 2007, the Norges Bank entered into an agreement with accountancy 
firm Deloitte AS on financial auditing of GPF. Nonetheless, the ultimate responsibility for the audit rests with the Office of the Auditor General.
As per the fund’s benchmark portfolio, equities account for 60% of the fund’s portfolio distributed as follows: Europe (50%), America/Africa 
(35%), and Asia/Oceania (15%). Fixed-income instruments account for 40% of the portfolio, distributed as follows: European currencies 
(60%), American currencies (35%), and Asian currencies (5%). In April 2008, the Government of Norway announced its intention to allow 
GPF to allocate up to 5% of its portfolio to real-estate investments. As of December 31, 2008, the fund had equity ownership in 7,900 compa-
nies across the globe. A national Council of Ethics reviews the fund’s holdings in all these companies based on strict guidelines imposed in 
2004. The fund avoids investments in arm manufacturing companies, and those that violate the environment and human rights.
Starting in 2007, the fund has published its voting records in the companies in which it holds equity, together with the basis for the voting de-
cisions. Any investment advice received by the Ministry of Finance from the Norges Bank is rendered public under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act. All information related to GPF is available at www.norges-bank.no. 
appendix a The Government Pension Fund-Global of Norway
